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coverage。 Prices instantly became attractive； particularly for the reinsurance that CAT writers themselves buy。 Just as instantly； Berkshire Hathaway offered to write up to 250 million of catastrophe coverage； advertising that proposition in trade publications。 Though we did not write all the business we sought； we did in a busy ten days book a substantial amount。
但是1989年的大灾害使得许多CAT业者穷于填补保险客户的伤口，使得地震灾后保单供给发生短缺，保费价格很快地就回到相当吸引人的水准，尤其是再保公司本身自己所买的保单，若有需要，Berkshire可以马上就签下2。5亿美元以上的保单，虽然并不是所有上门的生意都接，但忙个十天下来所签的保单金额也是相当可观。
Our willingness to put such a huge sum on the line for a loss that could occur tomorrow sets us apart from any reinsurer in the world。 There are； of course； panies that sometimes write 250 million or even far more of catastrophe coverage。 But they do so only when they can； in turn； reinsure a large percentage of the business with other panies。 When they can't 〃lay off〃 in size； they disappear from the market。
世界上再没有其它再保公司会像我们一样，愿意一口气接受如此大金额的投保，当然也有保险公司偶尔会愿意接下二亿五美金的灾害理赔保险，但是其提通常是他们可以再向其它保险公司分保出去，当他们找不到分散风险的再保公司时，他们会马上退出市场。
Berkshire's policy； conversely； is to retain the business we write rather than lay it off。 When rates carry an expectation of profit； we want to assume as much risk as is prudent。 And in our case； that's a lot。
相反地Berkshire的政策则是保留大部分的保额而不是把他们给分配掉，当保险费率看起来有利可图，我们很愿意承担更多的风险，以外界的标准而言，那应该是个大数字。
We will accept more reinsurance risk for our own account than any other pany because of two factors： （1） by the standards of regulatory accounting； we have a net worth in our insurance panies of about 6 billion … the second highest amount in the United States； and （2） we simply don't care what earnings we report quarterly； or even annually； just as long as the decisions leading to those earnings （or losses） were reached intelligently。
我们之所以愿意承担比一般保险公司更多的风险，主要有两个原因： （1）以会计原则的规范标准，我们的保险公司净值高达60亿美金，位居全美第二（2）我们并不在乎每季的短期盈余数字，就算是每年也无所谓，只要长期而言，这些决策是基于稳健获利的立场所作的明智决定。
Obviously； if we write 250 million of catastrophe coverage and retain it all ourselves； there is some probability that we will lose the full 250 million in a single quarter。 That probability is low； but it is not zero。 If we had a loss of that magnitude； our after…tax cost would be about 165 million。 Though that is far more than Berkshire normally earns in a quarter； the damage would be a blow only to our pride； not to our well…being。
很明显地如此我们接下二亿五的灾害保险，并自留大部分的保额，很有可能我们会在一夕之间损失这二亿五，这种机率虽然很低，却并不表示没有可能，若真的发生那样的损失，我们的税后损失大概会是1。65亿，相较于Berkshire每季所赚的盈余来说，只能算是个小数字，虽然会我们会丢了面子，但还不至于失了里子。
This posture is one few insurance managements will assume。 Typically； they are willing to write scads of business on terms that almost guarantee them mediocre returns on equity。 But they do not want to expose themselves to an embarrassing single…quarter loss； even if the managerial strategy that causes the loss promises； over time； to produce superior results。 I can understand their thinking： What is best for their owners is not necessarily best for the managers。 Fortunately Charlie and I have both total job security and financial interests that are identical with those of our shareholders。 We are willing to look foolish as long as we don't feel we have acted foolishly。
这种态度在保险业界来说实在是少之又少，通常一般的保险公司会愿意接下很多的保单以确定公司每年可以获得一定的利益，但他们却不愿意公司在某一个单季发生大额的损失，虽然这种短期损失可以获致更长远的利益；我想我能够体谅他们的立场，对股东最有利的事并一定对经理人最好，很幸运的查理跟我的工作保障与身家利益与所有的股东皆一致，我们愿意被人当作是傻子，只要我们自己知道我们不是个傻子。
Our method of operation； incidentally； makes us a stabilizing force in the industry。 We add huge capacity when capacity is short and we bee less petitive only when capacity is abundant。 Of course； we don't follow this policy in the interest of stabilization … we follow it because we believe it to be the most sensible and profitable course of action。 Nevertheless； our behavior steadies the market。 In this case； Adam Smith's invisible hand works as advertised。
事实上我们这样的经营策略让我们成为市场上的稳定力量，当供给短缺时，我们可以马上进场满足大家的需求，而当市场过于饱和时，我们又会立即退出市场观望，当然我们这样的做法并不只是为了达到市场的稳定而已，我们之所以会这样做是因为我们认为这样才是最合理、对大家最有利的做法，当然这样的做法间接达到稳定市场的效果，也符合亚当．史密斯所提市场有一只看不见的手的说法。
Currently； we hold an exceptional amount of float pared to premium volume。 This circumstance should produce quite favorable insurance results for us during the next few years as it did in 1989。 Our underwriting losses should be tolerable and our investment ine from policyholder funds large。 This pleasant situation； however； will gradually deteriorate as our float runs off。
现阶段相较于保费收入，我们自留的大部分的浮存金，这样的情形应该可以让我们往后几年的获利像1989年那样不错的结果，承保损失应该还可以接受，相较之下我们靠投资所赚得的利益却更为惊人，只是这种好现象可能会随着浮存金的流失而渐渐光芒不再。
At some point； however； there will be an opportunity for us to write large amounts of profitable business。 Mike Goldberg and his management team of Rod Eldred； Dinos Iordanou； Ajit Jain； Phil Urban； and Don Wurster continue to position us well for this eventuality。
不过在其它方面，还是有机会能够让我们找到大额且有利可图的生意，Mike Goldberg与其经营团队，长期而言可以为我们创造有利的地位。
Marketable Securities
有价证券投资
In selecting marketable securities for our insurance panies； we generally choose among five major categories： （1） long…term mon stock investments； （2） medium…term fixed ine securities； （3） long…term fixed ine securities； （4） short…term cash equivalents； and （5） short…term arbitrage mitments。
在为我们的保险事业选择有价证券投资之时，我们主要有五种选择（1）长期股票投资（2）长期固定收益债券（3）中期固定收益债券（4）短期约当现金（5）短期套利交易。
We have no particular bias when it es to choosing from these categories； we just continuously search among them for the highest after…tax returns as measured by 〃mathematical expectation；〃 limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand。 Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings； our goal； rather； is to maximize eventual net worth。
对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找最高的税后报酬预计的数学期望值，且仅限于我们自认为了解熟悉的投资，我们无意让与短期的帐面盈余好看，我们的目标是让长期的净值极大化。
Below we list our mon stock holdings having a value of over 100 million。 A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100％。
下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关系企业�