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foolish loan decisions of once well…regarded banks were put on public display。 As one huge loss after another was unveiled … often on the heels of managerial assurances that all was well … investors understandably concluded that no bank's numbers were to be trusted。 Aided by their flight from bank stocks； we purchased our 10％ interest in Wells Fargo for 290 million； less than five times after…tax earnings； and less than three times pre…tax earnings。
我们是在1990年银行股一片混乱之间买进Wells Fargo的股份的，这种失序的现象是很合理的，几个月来有些原本经营名声不错的银行，其错误的贷款决定却一一被媒体揭露，随着一次又一次庞大的损失数字被公布，银行业的诚信与保证也一次又一次地被践踏，渐渐地投资人越来越不敢相信银行的财务报表数字，趁着大家出脱银行股之际，我们却逆势以2。9亿美元，五倍不到的本益比（若是以税前获利计算，则本益比甚至不到三倍），买进Wells Fargo 10％的股份。
Wells Fargo is big … it has 56 billion in assets … and has been earning more than 20％ on equity and 1。25％ on assets。 Our purchase of one…tenth of the bank may be thought of as roughly equivalent to our buying 100％ of a 5 billion bank with identical financial characteristics。 But were we to make such a purchase； we would have to pay about twice the 290 million we paid for Wells Fargo。 Moreover； that 5 billion bank； manding a premium price； would present us with another problem： We would not be able to find a Carl Reichardt to run it。 In recent years； Wells Fargo executives have been more avidly recruited than any others in the banking business； no one； however； has been able to hire the dean。
Wells Fargo实在是相当的大，帐面资产高达560亿美元，股东权益报酬率高达20％，资产报酬率则为1。25％，买下他10％的股权相当于以买下一家50亿美元资产100％股权，但是真要有这样条件的银行，其价码可能会是2。9亿美元的一倍以上，此外就算真的可以买得到，我们同样也要面临另外一个问题，那就是找不到像Carl Reichardt这样的人才来经营，近几年来，从Wells Fargo出身的经理人一直广受各家银行同业所欢迎，但想要请到这家银行的老宗师可就不是一件容易的事了。
Of course； ownership of a bank … or about any other business … is far from riskless。 California banks face the specific risk of a major earthquake； which might wreak enough havoc on borrowers to in turn destroy the banks lending to them。 A second risk is systemic … the possibility of a business contraction or financial panic so severe that it would endanger almost every highly…leveraged institution； no matter how intelligently run。 Finally； the market's major fear of the moment is that West Coast real estate values will tumble because of overbuilding and deliver huge losses to banks that have financed the expansion。 Because it is a leading real estate lender； Wells Fargo is thought to be particularly vulnerable。
当然拥有一家银行的股权，或是其它企业也一样，绝非没有风险，像加州的银行就因为位于地震带而必须承担客户受到大地震影响而还不出借款的风险，第二个风险是属于系统性的，也就是严重的企业萧条或是财务风暴导致这些高财务杠杆经营的金融机构，不管经营的再好都有相当的危机，最后市场当时主要的考虑点是美国西岸的房地产因为供给过多而崩盘的风险，连带使得融资给这些扩张建案的银行承担钜额的损失，而也因为Wells Fargo就是市场上最大的不动产借款银行，一般咸认它最容易受到伤害。
None of these eventualities can be ruled out。 The probability of the first two occurring； however； is low and even a meaningful drop in real estate values is unlikely to cause major problems for well…managed institutions。 Consider some mathematics： Wells Fargo currently earns well over 1 billion pre…tax annually after expensing more than 300 million for loan losses。 If 10％ of all 48 billion of the bank's loans … not just its real estate loans … were hit by problems in 1991； and these produced losses （including foregone interest） averaging 30％ of principal； the pany would roughly break even。
以上所提到的风险都很难加以排除，当然第一点与第二点的可能性相当低，而且即使是房地产大幅的下跌，对于经营绩效良好的银行也不致造成太大的问题，我们可以简单地算一下，Wells Fargo现在一年在提列3亿美元的损失准备之后，税前还可以赚10亿美元以上，今天假若该银行所有的480亿借款中有10％在1991年发生问题，且估计其中有30％的本金将收不回来，必须全部转为损失（包含收不回来的利息），则在这种情况下，这家银行还是可以损益两平。
A year like that … which we consider only a low…level possibility； not a likelihood … would not distress us。 In fact； at Berkshire we would love to acquire businesses or invest in capital projects that produced no return for a year； but that could then be expected to earn 20％ on growing equity。 Nevertheless； fears of a California real estate disaster similar to that experienced in New England caused the price of Wells Fargo stock to fall almost 50％ within a few months during 1990。 Even though we had bought some shares at the prices prevailing before the fall； we weled the decline because it allowed us to pick up many more shares at the new； panic prices。
若是真有一年如此，虽然我们认为这种情况发生的可能性相当低，我们应该还可以忍受，事实上在Berkshire选择购并或是投资一家公司，头一年不赚钱没有关系，只要以后每年能够有20％的股东权益报酬率，尽管如此，加州大地震使得投资人害怕新英格兰地区也会有同样的危险，导致Wells Fargo在1990年几个月间大跌50％以上，虽然在股价下跌前我们已买进一些股份，但股价下跌使我们可以开心地用更低的价格捡到更多的股份。
Investors who expect to be ongoing buyers of investments throughout their lifetimes should adopt a similar attitude toward market fluctuations； instead many illogically bee euphoric when stock prices rise and unhappy when they fall。 They show no such confusion in their reaction to food prices： Knowing they are forever going to be buyers of food； they wele falling prices and deplore price increases。 （It's the seller of food who doesn't like declining prices。） Similarly； at the Buffalo News we would cheer lower prices for newsprint … even though it would mean marking down the value of the large inventory of newsprint we always keep on hand … because we know we are going to be perpetually buying the product。
以长期投资作为终生目标的投资人对于股市波动也应该采取同样的态度，千万不要因为股市涨就欣喜若狂，股市跌就如丧考妣，奇怪的是他们对于食物的价格就一点都不会搞错，很清楚知道自己每天一定会买食物，当食物价格下跌时，他们可高兴的很，（要烦恼的应该是卖食物的人），同样的在水牛城报纸我们期望印刷成本能够降低，虽然这代表我们必须将帐列的新闻印刷存货价值向下调整，因为我们很清楚，我们必须一直买进这些产品。
Identical reasoning guides our thinking about Berkshire's investments。 We will be buying businesses … or small parts of businesses； called stocks … year in； year out as long as I live （and longer； if Berkshire's directors attend the seances I have scheduled）。 Given these intentions； declining prices for businesses benefit us； and rising prices hurt us。
同样的原则也适用在Berkshire的投资之上，只要我还健在（若我死后，Berkshire的董事会愿意透过我所安排的降神会接受我的指示，则期间或许更长久），我们会年复一年买下企业或是企业的一部份…也就是股票，也因此企业的价格下跌对我们会更有利，反之则可能会对我们不利。
The most mon cause of low prices is pessimism … some times pervasive； some times specific to a pany or industry。 We want to do business in such an environment； not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces。 It's optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer。
股价不振最主要的原因是悲观的情绪，有�